Abstract. With cumulative innovation and imperfect information about the value of innovations, intellectual property rights can result in hold-up and therefore it may be better not to have them. Extending the basic cumulative innovation model to include 'sampling' by second-stage firms, we find that the lower the cost of sampling, or the larger the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable. Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new 'ideas' implies a reduction in the socially optimal level of rights such as patent and copyright.
Introduction
[The] 90-minute documentary [Wanderlust] ... was also a window into the frustrations of making a clip-intensive film dependent on copyright clearance, which has become hugely expensive in the past decade. Initial quotations for the necessary sequences came to more than $450,000, which would have raised by half the cost of the IFC film. ... "Paramount wanted $20,000 for 119 seconds of Paper Moon", Ms. Sams said. "The studios are so afraid of exploitation that they set boundaries no one will cross. Even after the prices were cut, we were $150,000 in the hole." 1 Cumulative innovation and creativity, whereby new work build upon old, is a pervasive phenomenon. However, it was not until recently that it received significant attention in the literature. The seminal paper in this regard is that of Green and Scotchmer (1995) .
They introduced a two-stage innovation model in which the second innovation is enabled by, or builds upon, the first. Their paper primarily concerns itself with how rents are divided between innovators at the two stages, in particular with the extent to which the first innovator is (under-)compensated for her contribution (the option value) to the second innovation. They investigate how different policy levers related to intellectual property rights, in particular breadth 2 , could be used to affect the bargaining (or its absence)
between different innovators and hence the resulting payoffs.
A central feature of their model, as well as subsequent work that extended it (such as Scotchmer (1996) ), was an assumption that knowledge of costs and returns, whether deterministic or stochastic, was shared equally by innovators at different stages (i.e. was common knowledge). With common knowledge all mutually beneficial transactions are concluded, using ex ante licenses where necessary to avoid the possibility of hold-up of second-stage innovators.
This assumption, however, is problematic. If all innovators share the same information why do we need different innovators at first and second stages and why concern ourselves
1 The New York Times, May 28, 2006 No Free Samples for Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips With the Fair-Use Doctrine. 2 A monopoly right (intellectual property right) such as a patent or a copyright confers the right to exclude not simply direct copies but also products that are sufficiently similar. The term lagging/leading breath are often used to denote the space of inferior/superior (respectively) products that are excluded by the patent/copyright (i.e. taken as infringing the monopoly).
with licenses and bargaining if a single innovator could just as easily do it all? The obvious answer is that this assumption is wrong, something suggested by a cursory observation of reality: many different firms engage in innovation precisely because they have specialized skills and knowledge that make it effective for them rather than another firm to engage in a given area. 3 Thus, in this paper we investigate cumulative innovation under asymmetric information, for example, where a first-stage innovator only has a probabilistic prior over the second-stage innovator's cost/values but the second-stage innovator knows them precisely 4 .
Our paper takes as a starting point a 'basic' model very similar to that presented by Bessen (2004) . (that is the royalty may be set above the level that a second-stage firm is willing to pay).
6
Thus, there is a trade-off: with IP more first-stage innovation takes place due to the extra royalty income received by first-stage firms but some second-stage innovation may be lost as a result of 'licensing failure' due to high royalty rates.
Such a trade-off is already familiar in the literature and our main reason for presenting it is to provide a benchmark and basis for the more complex 'sampling' model presented in the second section. The 'sampling' model extends the first by introducing the idea of 3 See e.g. Eisenberg and Heller (1998) ; Hall and Ziedonis (2001) ; Cockburn (2005) . 4 Of course, for consistency, the collective distribution of the values/costs of all second-stage innovators should correspond to the prior of the first innovator. 5 We differ from Bessen slightly in that his focus is primarily on whether ex ante or ex post licensing occurs. Central to this analysis is his introduction of ex post royalty shares which are the royalty shares that take place in the absence of licensing. These are determined exogenously -perhaps as a policy variable or determined by invent-around costs and other factors -and Bessen shows that the socially optimal ex post royalty share is less than that obtained in ex ante bargaining (and so all licensing should occur ex post). By contrast, in our model we do not have the concept of an ex post royalty share: either a second-stage innnovator obtains a license or she does not (and so then cannot produce). 6 We note that Bessen uses the term 'holdup' to denote what we term 'licensing failure'. Since he is considering ex-ante licensing his use of the term 'hold-up' differs somewhat from the traditional usage as there are no sunk relationship-specific investments (a binding contract is possible ex-ante). Rather the 'hold-up' is simply that, just like a monopolist facing heterogeneous consumers, a first-stage innovator is facing a set of second-stage innovators with private and heterogeneous values and so may set a profitmaximizing royalty rate that excludes some second-stage innovators from licensing. Since, the 'sampling' case we discuss below resembles more closely a traditional 'hold-up' situation we prefer to reserve that term for use there and to to use 'licensing failure' for the situation described here.
sampling, that is that second-stage firms engage in some form of (costly) effort prior to the point that any kind of royalty setting and licensing takes place. Imagine, for example, that a second-stage innovator must search out, trial and experiment with, (many) first-stage innovations prior to deciding which first-stage innovation they can, or want to, use (and therefore license). Furthermore, the more products they sample, the more likely it is a second-stage firm comes up with a good idea of its own (or a good match between its idea and existing ideas or products on which it can build) -which is modelled, in this case, by the firm's innovation being of high, rather than of low, net value (net, that is, of costs).
Classic real-world examples of such a situation can be found in the software and music industries. In software a new application will likely combine many ideas (and even code) from previous products. But ideas can only come from applications that one has encountered. 7 In music, particularly modern music, re-use either explicit or implicit is ubiquitous.
For example, in dance and hip-hop, 'sampling', whereby a small section of a previous work is directly copied and then repeated or reworked in some manner, is the very basis of the genre. More generally all composers whether classical or modern use previous musical, ideas, motifs, and melodies as parts of new works 8 .
Sampling benefits a firm by increasing the probability of having a high value innovation but it is costly. As it takes place prior to any kind of royalty negotiation it may lead to hold-up: the hold-up of the sampling effort. As a result the presence of IP rights that require second-stage innovators to license may now have another cost in addition to that from traditional 'licensing failure': fearing high royalty rates second-stage firms will reduce the level of sampling they do and thereby reduce the average quality of second-stage innovations. Because this effect operates across all second-stage innovators its consequences for welfare may be substantially greater than the traditional 'licensing failure' problem (which only affects low value second-stage innovators).
Turning to the comparative statics, we find that, in general, the lower the sampling costs or the larger the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable. Thus, in 7 We should distinguish here between reuse of ideas and reuse of code. With software copyright but no software patents one would (within limits) be free to reuse the ideas found in existing applications. It also has a close connection to the recent work of Bessen and Maskin (2006 We adopt a simple model of two stage innovation in which the second innovation builds upon the first in some manner -either as an application or as an extension of it. All agents are risk-neutral and act to maximize profits.
Innovations are described by their net value v (revenue minus costs). Because our interest lies in examining the trade-off between innovation at different stages we make no distinction between social and private value (i.e. there are no deadweight losses) and v may be taken to be both.
We assume the base (first) innovation takes two values: low (v L 1 ) and high (v H 1 ) with probability p, (1 − p) respectively. We assume that v L 1 < 0 so that without some additional source of revenue, for example from licensing (see below), the innovation will not be produced. High value innovations have positive stand-alone value, v H 1 > 0, and so do not require an outside source of revenue in order to be profitable.
Second-stage innovations also take two values: low (v L 2 ) and high (v H 2 ) with probability q, (1 − q) respectively and v H 2 > v L 2 > 0. While the value of a second-stage innovation is known to the innovator who produces it, the value is not known to the owner of the firststage innovation which it builds upon (this could occur because of imperfect information regarding revenue, costs or both). without intellectual property rights she may market freely without payment or licence.
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We assume that the direct returns to the first innovator (v 1 ) are unaffected by the intellectual property rights regime. This assumption is not as strong as it first appears since simple business stealing, in which the total combined rents of the two stages remain unchanged, could be incorporated into this model simply by increasing p, the proportion of first stage innovations that are low value. 12 Of course, if there is rent dissipation, due, say to further product market competition, this would not be the case and a richer model would be required. Given our need to keep the analysis tractable, and that the focus in this paper is on the division of rents between first and second-stage innovators, we do not take this approach, though we do return to the matter briefly in the conclusion.
Finally, we take the licence to define a lump-sum royalty payment r. This assumption is without loss of generality since, in this model, an innovation is entirely defined by its net value v and there are no other attributes available to use in designing a mechanism to discriminate between types of second-stage innovator. 13 The royalty is set ex-ante, that is prior to the second-stage innovator's decision to invest, and is in the form of a take-it-or-leave it offer by the first-stage innovator.
2.1.2. Sequence of Actions. The sequence of actions in the model is:
(1) Nature determines the value type of the first-stage innovator.
10 Allowing values of v
does not alter the analysis in any significant way but brings extra complexity to the statement and proof of propositions. 11 Given that we are dealing with cumulative innovation some readers might prefer the infringing (I) vs. non-infringing (NI) dichotomy with its implication of a distinction between 'horizontal' imitation and 'vertical' improvement of a product. 12 The assumption would also be valid in the case where there is little substitution between the first and second-stage innovation. For example, where the first innovation is a tool used in developing the secondstage innovation. 13 For example, there are no quantities on which to base a non-linear pricing scheme (fixed fee plus per unit fee royalty). For the same reason there is no opportunity to use type-contingent menus, or any other form of more complex licensing agreement, to increase total royalty income by discriminating between high and low value innovators.
Player
Second-Stage Innovator
First Stage Innovator
Value Type Low (q) (3) The first-stage innovator sets the royalty rate r (under the no/weak IP regime second-stage innovations do not infringe and so the de facto royalty rate is 0).
(4) Nature determines the value type of a second-stage innovator.
(5) Given this royalty rate second-stage firms decide whether to invest.
(6) Payoffs are realized.
The action/payoff matrix is summarized in Table 1. 2.2. Solving the Model. Define a constant, α, as follows:
Proposition 2.1. With intellectual property rights, the game defined above has the following Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria. A second-stage innovator invests if and only if its realized value is greater than or equal to the royalty rate (i.e. net profits are non-negative).
A first-stage innovator invests and sets a low royalty rate (RL), r L = v L 2 if the probability of a low value innovation (q) is greater than α and a high royalty rate (RH) r H = v H 2 if q ≤ α. When q = α the first-stage innovator may set any royalty of the form r L with probability x and r H with probability 1 − x, x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, there always exist a pure strategy equilibrium and except when q = α, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2.2. Without intellectual property rights the game above has the following solution: both types of second-stage innovators invest but, of first-stage innovators, only those that have 'high-value' innovations invest (there are 1 − p of these type). 1 . Let us now consider social welfare in the four possible situations given by (IP, RL), (IP, RH), (NIP, RL), (NIP,RH) as well as the difference in welfare between an intellectual property regime and a no intellectual property regime (IP-NIP). Due to our earlier assumption welfare is determined by calculating total net value. Define for conve-
, the average first-stage innovator value (if all innovate), and v 2 = qv L 2 + (1 − q)v H 2 , the average second-stage innovator value (if all innovate). We summarize the welfare situation in Table 2. 2.4. Policy Implications. Proposition 2.3. When a low royalty will be set (q ≥ α) an IP regime is optimal.
Proof. In the low royalty (RL) situation all second-stage innovations will be produced whether there is IP or not. In that case one wishes to maximize returns to the first innovator and patents do this by transferring rents via licensing. Formally in the low royalty case the welfare difference between patents and no patents (IP-NIP) is:
Both of the terms in brackets are positive implying that the intellectual property regime delivers higher welfare than the no intellectual property (NIP) regime.
The situation when the high royalty will be set is less clear. First, define β as the proportion of the royalty payment to a low-value first-stage innovator that would be 'used up' in paying their extra costs:
Note that v L 1 is negative and must be less in absolute terms than the royalty received (1 − q)r H as we are assuming that the royalty enables low value first-stage innovators to produce. Under this definition β = 1 corresponds to the case where all of the royalty paid to a low-cost first-stage innovator being used to pay their 'extra' costs while β ≈ 0 means all of the royalty payment is being retained as extra profits (and welfare).
Proposition 2.4. When a high royalty will be set (q < α) an intellectual property regime will be preferable to a no intellectual property (NIP) regime if and only if (NB: in fact with equality one would be indifferent):
Proof. From Table 2 an IP regime yields higher welfare than an NIP regime if and only if:
Making p the subject of this inequality and using β we obtain the stated result.
We represent the import of these propositions graphically in Figure 1 , a diagram which shows optimal policy regions as a function of the exogenous probabilities of low value first-stage (p) and second-stage (q) innovations.
Remarks: in the high royalty case (RH) q is the proportion of second-stage innovations that do not occur with intellectual property rights (due to high royalties and the resulting licensing failure) while p is the proportion of first-stage innovations that do not occur without intellectual property rights. As first-stage innovations enable second-stage ones when we lose a first-stage innovation we lose all dependent second-stage ones as well.
Due to this, when β is low for no intellectual property rights to be preferable q must be substantially higher than p. It is only then that the cost of intellectual property rights, in Figure 1 . Optimal policy as a function of the probabilities of low value first-stage (p) and second-stage (q) innovations. α equals 0.7 so to the right of the line q = 0.7 a low royalty will be set (RL) and an IP regime is optimal.
To the left of that line we have shown three different 'horizontal' lines which demarcate the boundary between IP being optimal (above the line) and no IP being optimal (below the line). The horizontal lines correspond (in ascending order) to β (the proportion of royalties used up by first stageinnovators) equal to 0, 0.5, and 0.99.
terms of lost second-stage innovations, will outweigh the gains in terms of more first-stage (and dependent second-stage) innovations.
As β increases the area in which no intellectual property rights are preferable will increase, with the line separating the two regions moving upwards. In the limit as β tends to 1 -which corresponds to all royalty income being used by a low value first-stage innovator to pay costs -the marginal p tends to 1, that is, it is optimal to have intellectual property rights only if all first-stage innovations are of a low value type. • Sampling has constant marginal cost τ . (4) The first-stage innovator sets the royalty rate r (under the no/weak IP regime second-stage innovations do not infringe and so the de facto royalty rate is 0).
(5) Nature determines the value type of a second-stage innovator. As before there are two types of stage 2 firms, high and low value: v H 2 , v L 2 . However, here: • The probability, q, that a second-stage firm is low value is a function of the sampling level: q ≡ q(k).
• Properties of q(k): q ≤ 0 (otherwise there is no benefit from sampling). There are diminishing returns to sampling: q ≥ 0 and if no sampling takes place all firms are of low value type (q(0) = 1). The functional form q(k) is assumed to be common knowledge.
(6) Given this royalty rate second-stage firms decide whether to invest. The new action/payoff matrix is shown in Table 3. 3.2. Solving the Model. Define, as in the basic model, a high royalty to be equal to the value of a high-value second-stage innovation: r H = v H 2 , and a low royalty to be equal to the value of a low-value second-stage innovation: We begin with a set of preliminary propositions which detail the players best responses before moving on to characterise the equilibrium under both (strong) IP and weak/no IP (NIP). innovator, whose belief about the sampling level is given by the cdf F (k) and whereq = E F (q(k)), will set a royalty of the form:
where α is as in the basic model, that is the probability such that a first-stage firm is indifferent between setting a high and a low royalty rate:
Proof. See appendix. innovators best response to a royalty of r, including 'composite' royalties of the form
(that is mixed royalty with r H played with probability x), is as follows:
where k r is defined implicitly by:
And k 2 is given as follows:
Theorem 3.5. With intellectual property rights (IP) the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game defined above falls into one of two cases:
(1) First-stage innovators: both high and low value types invest, believe that second-stage innovators sample at level k 2 and set a low royalty rate.
(2) Second-stage innovators: sample at level k 2 and both high and low value types invest.
(ii) Mixed royalty case (k 2 > k α )
(1) First-stage innovators: both high and low value types invest, believe that second-stage innovators sample at level k α and set a mixed royalty rate consisting of a high royalty (r H ) with probability x α and a low royalty (r L ) with
14 If q (0) > −∞ then for values of r sufficiently close to rH = v H 2 this equation will have no solution. In such cases define kr = 0. 15 We use the subscript 2 because this is the level of sampling undertaken when all second-stage innovators (both high and low types) always.
probability (1 − x α ) where:
(2) Second-stage innovators: sample at level k α and invest if and only if the realized value of their innovation is greater than the royalty rate (though the first-stage innovator is playing a mixed strategy the second-stage innovator knows the royalty rate with certainty at the point of investment).
Proof. See appendix. Remark 3.7. Recall that k 2 is the sampling level undertaken by a second-stage firm in the case when both high and low value second-stage innovators invest (so it occurs either in the case where there is no IP or when the royalty is sufficiently low). It is also, therefore, the sampling level which maximizes expected second-stage innovation value and, for that reason, the socially optimal sampling level.
3.3. Welfare. For the welfare calculations we proceed as in the original model. A proportion p of first-stage innovations are low value (v L 1 < 0) and only occur when there is royalty income. Analogously to the basic model define
(the expected value generated by a second-stage innovator sampling at level k).
Proposition 3.8. [The Optimal Regime in the Low Royalty Case] In the low royalty case (k 2 < k α ) it is optimal to have an IP regime (compared to weak/no IP one). Specifically if 16 Note examining the definition of k2 shows that kα < k2 guarantees that xα is non-negative. the proportion (p) of first-stage innovation that is lost without IP is positive then welfare is higher with IP (otherwise p = 0 and both regimes generate the same level of welfare).
This result has a simple intuition behind it. The low royalty case encompasses the situation where the sampling level is fairly low even when the royalty rate faced by secondstage firms is small (k 2 ≤ k α ) -this may occur because sampling is costly (τ is high) or generates little benefit (v H 2 andv L 2 are close). As a result most second-stage innovations are low value and so a first-stage innovator sets a low royalty rate (r L ). Hence (a) there is no 'licensing failure' and (b) all second-stage firms sample at the optimum rate (k 2 ). Taken together these mean that, just as with the low royalty case of the simpler model, there are no costs to having strong IP. Since, thanks to the licensing income, there is more (by an amount p) first stage innovation under strong IP than under weak/no IP the strong IP regime is clearly better. Licensing Failure Cost: licensing failure occurs when a second-stage firm with a lowvalue innovation is faced with a high royalty rate. Under the IP regime x α is the probability that a high royalty is set by a first-stage innovator q(k α is the probability a second-stage firm has a low-value innovation. Thus x α q(k α ) is the probability that licensing failure occurs and when it does the loss equals the potential value of the second-stage innovation: Proposition 3.12. The sampling levels k α and k 2 have the following comparative statics:
And taking limits:
Proof. Recall that we have:
Given that q < 0 and q > 0 the results following trivially by simple differentiation.
Remark 3.13. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. k α is the level of sampling that leaves a first-stage innovator indifferent between charging a high and a low royalty rate. As such it is a function only of the relative values of the two types of innovation (and of q) and does not depend on the cost of sampling at all.
The intuition in the second case is a little more complicated. If we increase v H 2 keeping v L 2 constant we increase the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations. Then the net change in revenue for a first-stage innovator's from switching to a high royalty rate must increase (loss of royalty revenue from low-value second-stage innovations is lower relative to royalty from high-value second-stage innovations). Hence, the proportion of high value second-stage innovations (1 − q(k)) at which the switch to a high royalty rate is made is smaller and the corresponding level of sampling (k α ) is smaller.
Coming to k 2 , which is the optimal level of sampling (and that performed under a low or zero royalty), we have unsurprisingly that as the cost of sampling goes down the amount of sampling goes up. Similarly, an increase in the relative size of a high value innovation compared to a low value one, increases the benefit of sampling and therefore increases the amount of sampling done.
Combining the differentials with the limits we have that (a) keeping other variables fixed there exists a unique finite τ * such that for τ < τ * , k 2 > k α and a mixed royalty is set (conversely for τ > τ * a low royalty is set and p m = 0); (b) similarly there exists a unique v * such that for v H 2 > v * , k 2 > k α and a mixed royalty is set (conversely for v H 2 < v H * 2 a low royalty is set and p m = 0). This then demonstrates the validity of the right-hand part of Figure 2 and the left-hand part of Figure 3 where we have p m = 0.
What occurs then if k 2 > k α and we are in the mixed royalty case?
Proposition 3.14. Assuming k 2 > k α (i.e. τ sufficiently small or v H 2 sufficiently large) then:
And we have that: dp m dτ < 0 dp m dv H 2 > 0 That is, the marginal level of first-stage innovation lost under weak/no IP (that is the level such that above this an IP regime is optimal) is (a) decreasing in sampling costs (b) increasing in the relative size of high value to low value second-stage innovations.
Informally this result can be explained as follows. Reductions in sampling costs will increase the 'optimal' level of sampling (k 2 ) relative to the restricted level of sampling (k α ). This in turn increases the cost of intellectual property rights arising from (a) loss of second-stage innovations due to licensing failure (x α · q(k α )); (b) lower average value of second-stage innovations (v 2 (k 2 )−v 2 (k α )); while having no effect on the surplus from extra first-stage innovations under IP. As a result the welfare under weak/no IP rises relative to the welfare under IP and the marginal p must rise.
Similarly if the relative size of high value second-stage innovation compared to a low value one rises this (a) increases the 'optimal' level of sampling (k 2 ) relative to the restricted level of sampling (k α ) (b) directly increases the benefit of sampling. This again increases the sampling cost and the licensing failure cost but reduces the surplus from second-stage innovations under IP. As a result welfare under weak/no IP rises relative to that under IP and the marginal p must rise.
This result then establishes the validity of the rest of Figures 2 and 3 and implies the following corollaries regarding how the optimal policy regime in relation to intellectual property rights varies in response to changes in the exogenous environment:
Corollary 3.15. Reducing sampling costs make it more likely that a freer (weak/no intellectual property rights) regime will be optimal.
Proof. Follows from previous propositions as summarised in Figure 2 .
Corollary 3.16. Increasing the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations (which could be interpreted as sampling becoming more important for product quality) makes it more likely that a freer (no intellectual property rights) regime will be optimal.
Proof. Follows from previous propositions as summarised in Figure 3 .
Remark 3.17. Most studies of the value of intellectual property rights (copyrights or patents) indicate that their distribution is highly skewed with a few very high value works and many low value works. This suggests that v H 2 >> v L 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how asymmetric information about the value of followon innovations, combined with intellectual property rights such as patents, can result in licensing failure and hold-up. Presenting the policy decision as a choice between having or not having intellectual property rights, we have shown that, in contrast to parts of the previous literature, in some circumstances it may be optimal not to have intellectual property rights. For whilst intellectual property rights help transfer income from secondstage to first-stage innovators they can also lead to licensing failure and hold-up with a resulting reduction in second-stage innovation.
In the first, and simpler, model presented, the basic results were summarized in Figure 1 , which plotted optimal policy as a function of the exogenous variables (the probabilities of high or low value innovations occurring at the two different innovation stages). Intellectual property rights in this model had two contrasting effects. On the one hand, there are the benefits of increased first-stage innovation as revenue is transferred to first-stage innovators from second-stage ones. On the other hand, there are costs in terms of fewer second-stage innovations due to licensing failure. In some circumstances the benefits will exceed the costs and we should have (stronger) intellectual property rights. In other cases, they will not and we should have weaker (or no) intellectual property rights. In particular, we showed that, if the probability of a low value second-stage innovation was high enough (but not too high), compared to the probability of a low value first-stage innovation, then a regime without intellectual property rights would be preferable.
Next, we extended this basic model by introducing 'sampling'. We demonstrated the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and showed that (strong) IP may restrict the level of sampling below what would be socially optimal. Therefore, in addition to the basic trade-off mentioned above between more first-stage innovations and fewer secondstage ones, there is the additional factor: those second-stage innovations which occur have lower average value due to a lower level of sampling. Examining this trade-off, we find that the lower the cost of sampling and the greater the differential between the low and high values of second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable.
Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new 'ideas' should imply a reduction in the socially optimal level of intellectual property rights such as patents and copyright. A perfect case of such technological change in recent years can be found in the rapid advances in computers and communications. These advances have, for example, dramatically reduced the cost of accessing and re-using cultural material, such as music and film, as well as greatly increasing the number of 'ideas' that a software developer can encounter and trial. Concrete policy actions that could be taken in line with these conclusions include extending 'fair-use' (fair-dealing) provisions in copyright law to increase the degree of reuse that would be permitted without the need to seek permission and excluding software and business methods from patentability.
Finally, we should emphasize that there remains plentiful scope to improve and extend the present paper. For instance, it was assumed that the non-royalty income for the first-stage and second-stage innovator was unaffected by the intellectual property rights regime. 17 However this is unlikely to be the case and the model could be improved by the inclusion of the direct effect of no (or weaker) intellectual property rights on the revenue of the first-stage (and second-stage) innovator.
It would also be useful to extend the analysis to the case of a continuous distribution of innovation values, as well as to investigate the consequences of making sampling costs 17 As discussed in detail above, while we do allow for business stealing between the first and second-stage innovators we do not allow for general rent dissipation from wider product market competition. or having heterogeneity across innovations with some developments used more than others.
Finally, one of the most important extensions would be to properly integrate transaction costs into the analysis. Transaction costs relating to both the acquisition of information and the execution of contracts are significant and without them we lack a key element for the furtherance of our understanding of the process of innovation both in this model and in general.
A. Proofs A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof. We are considering only subgame perfect nash equilibria so we may begin at the final stage of the game and work backwards. Given a royalty level of r, at the final stage, a second-stage innovator of type X faces a payoff of v X 2 − r if she invests and 0 if she does not. Thus, a second-stage innovator, seeking to maximize profits will invest if and only if v X 2 ≥ r (formally, they are indifferent if r = v X 2 . However if they do not invest when v X 2 = 0 there will be no equilibrium of the overall game). Given this, by simple dominance and focusing on pure strategies, a first-stage innovator must EITHER (a) set a low royalty rate r L = v L 2 which will lead to investment by all second-stage innovations; OR (b) set a high royalty rate r H = v H 2 which will result in investment only by high value second-stage innovations. In the first case the payoff is r L while in the second it is (1 − q)r H . Thus, a low royalty rate should be chosen if and only if (assuming that if payoffs are equal a low royalty is chosen):
Since any mixed royalty strategy must consist of some combination of r L and r H we have immediately that a proper mixed strategy is only possible when r L = (1 − q)r H , that is if q = α.
Finally, total royalty income to a first-stage innovator is at least r L = v L 2 . Thus, total net income for a low-value first-stage innovator is at Proof. Given a first-stage innovator believes F (k), the expected probability that a secondstage firm is low value is E F (q(k)) =q. By subgame perfection a first-stage innovator knows that, once a seond-stage firm discovers its type, its best response to a given royalty will be as stated in Proposition 3.1. In particular, if the royalty rate is set to be less than or equal to the second-stage low value (v L 2 ) all second-stage innovators will license, if a royalty is above this but less than or equal to the second-stage high value (v H 2 ) then only high value firms will license (1 −q of them) and if the royalty is higher than this no second-stage firms will license. Then, letting G(r) be the cumulative distribution function over royalties representing the first-stage innovator's mixed strategy, the expected payoff to a first-stage innovator is:
Maximizing with respect to G(r) immediately gives that, just as for the basic model, an optimal mixed strategy can only consist of some combination of the pure strategy r L = v L 2 and the pure strategy r H = v H 2 . Let us suppose that these two pure strategies, r H , r L , are played with probability x, 1 − x respectively. Revenue from royalties is then:
Maximizing revenue requires x = 0 if the term in brackets is less than zero, x = 1 if the term in brackets is greater than 0, and allows any value of x if the term in brackets is zero. By the definition of α (see above) these conditions correspond precisely toq (the expected probability of a low value innovation) being less than, greater than or equal to α. Hence, the first-stage innovator's royalty response as a function of their belief about the level of sampling is of the form stated.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof. Using the optimal investment stage determined in Proposition 3.1, for a given sampling level k, payoffs as a function of the royalty levels are as in Table 4 . Suppose second-stage innovator plays a strategy given by the cdf F (k) and a first-stage innovator sets a royalty defined by a cumulative distribution function G(r). Then the payoff to a second-stage innovator is as follows (where expectations are taken with respect to F and q is short for q(k)):
Claim: Second-stage innovators play pure strategies.
Proof: q is convex so −q is concave. Suppose we have a mixed strategy F (k) with
with equality if and only if F (k) is a point distribution (i.e. corresponds to a pure strategy). Substituting:
(With equality iff and only if F (k) is a point distribution with k =k with probability 1). Thus for any properly mixed strategy F (k) we can always achieve a higher payoff by playing the pure strategyk = E(k).
Thus, in what follows we may confine our attention to pure strategies k. Returning to the payoff function we first note that if royalty (or royalties in a mixed strategy) are all greater than r H (formally the support of G(r) lies entirely above r H ) then the optimal sampling level is zero (Π 2 (k) = −kτ ).
When this is not the case we have the first order condition is:
The second order condition, Π ≤ 0, is easily checked: Π = −q (k) · (+ve) < 0 since, by assumption,
For ease of reference define S as the denominator in the previous equation. We shall look at several special cases as follows:
The profitmaximizing k therefore equals k 2 where (as defined above):
The intuition here is simple: both firms always invest and pay the royalty. Thus, in terms of the payoff sampling will only affect the value type and the sampling level will be chosen so that the marginal gain in terms of lower costs,
, equals the marginal sampling costs, τ .
(ii) r L < r < r H . Here G(r L ) = 0, G(r H ) = 1 and we have S = v H 2 − r and the optimal k ≡ k r solves:
2 − r (iii) r H played with probability x and r L with probability (1 − x). Then G(r L ) = (1 − x), G(r H ) = 1. Define the 'composite' royalty r = xr
So the optimal sampling level is k ≡ k r where r is the composite royalty.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.5.
Proof. We will solve for a subgame perfect Bayesian nash equilibrium by recursing backwards through the game.
In previous propositions we have already derived the best-response correspondences (where the royalty best-response is defined in terms of beliefs about sampling rather than the actual sampling level). We have also shown second-stage firms will always play a pure strategy (i.e. choose a single sampling level). Furthermore, at the sampling stage all second-stage firms are the same, hence all second-stage firms will choose the same pure sampling strategy. Thus, a first-stage innovator's beliefs (to be consistent) must be single-valued and we may rewrite the royalty best-response correspondence in terms of their belief as to the sampling level (k):
There are three possibilities for the beliefs of a first stage innovator regarding the sampling level of second-stage firms:
Hence the first-stage innovator would set a high royalty rate. Then second-stage innovator's best response is k = 0 and beliefs will be inconsistent.
Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium with such beliefs.
(ii) k < k α . In this case the best response of a first-stage innovator is to set a low royalty (r L ) in which case second-stage firm must choose a sampling level k = k 2 .
Thus, for beliefs to be consistent, a first-stage innovator must believe k = k 2 and the equilibrium is as claimed.
(iii) k = k α . In this case a first-stage innovator's best response correspondence consists of all mixed strategies: r H with probability x, r L with probability 1−x for x ∈ [0, 1]. Now a second-stage innovator (if behaving optimally) never samples above the level k 2 and will sample strictly below k 2 if the first-stage innovator plays any strategy in which r H is played with positive probability. Hence if beliefs are to be consistent we must have (a) k 2 = k α and (b) x = 0 (i.e. a low royalty is always set). In such a case the equilibrium is again as claimed.
Case 2: k 2 > k α . There are three possibilities for the beliefs of a first stage innovator regarding the sampling level of second-stage firms:
(i) k > k α . Just as in the first case this leads to inconsistent beliefs and so cannot be an equilibrium.
But k 2 > k α . Thus, beliefs will be inconsistent and this cannot be an equilibrium.
19 At the sampling stage all second-stage firms are the same and their best-response correspondence is singlevalued. Hence all second-stage firms must have the same sampling strategy and a first-stage innovator's belief (iii) k = k α . In this case a first-stage innovator best response correspondence consists of all mixed strategies: r H with probability x, r L with probability 1 − x for x ∈ [0, 1].
Denote the corresponding composite royalty by r(x) = xr H + (1 − x)r L . Then for an equilibrium (with consistent beliefs) we must find an x such that the bestresponse sampling level equals k α . Formally, using the notation of Proposition 3.4
we must find an x such k r(x) = k α . The best response sampling level is defined implicitly by:
2 ) Since q < 0 we have, denoting k(x) as the implicit solution as a function of x, that k (x) < 0 (intuitively a higher average royalty lowers sampling). Since k(0) = k 2 > k α and that k(1) = 0 (as x → 1 the RHS of the above takes arbitrarily large negative values), by the intermediate value theorem and the monotonicity of k(x), there must exist a unique x α ∈ (0, 1) such that k(x α ) = k α . Replacing q (k) by q (k α ) and rearranging we have as claimed that:
First-stage innovators investment strategy: finally as with our basic model firststage innovators of both types invest because with royalty income net profits will be non-negative.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3.8.
Proof. Analogously to the low royalty case in the basic model, in this situation all secondstage innovators invest so (a) there is no licensing failure (b) second-stage firms sample at the optimal level (k 2 ). At the same time, intellectual property allows some first-stage innovators to engage in production who wouldn't be able to do so otherwise. Hence an IP regime will deliver higher welfare.
Formally, the welfare difference between the IP and NIP regime is net surplus associated with the p extra first-stage innovations that occur under IP:
Both the first term (by the assumption that the royalty is sufficient to allow production) and the second (since second-stage innovators are making non-negative profits) are positive. Hence, if p > 0 the sum is positive and welfare is higher with intellectual property.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3.9.
Proof. In this case comparing the IP to the no/weak IP regime we have the following differences:
(+) Under IP there are (p) extra first-stage (and dependent second-stage) innovation because the royalty income allows some first-stage innovators to produce who would not otherwise: 
Licensing Failure Cost ) An IP regime is optimal compared to a weak/no IP (NIP) if the first effect is larger than the second (and vice versa):
Where p m has been defined as the probability of a low value first-stage innovation which leaves one indifferent between having and not having intellectual property rights.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 3.14. Then,
Examining the differentials of S, H, E we have:
For the last equation note, that by definition of k α , v 2 (k α ) = (1 + q(k α ))v L 2 − k α τ and that for k < k 2 , v (k) > 0 so that:
Putting these derivatives together with the derivative of p m with respect to S, H, E we have the required result.
